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March 17, 1953

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PART II - ANALYSIS1. Introduction

This section consists of an outline of the general pattern of current U.S. psychological operations in Western Europe, particularly those in support of the defense effort, an examination of their impact on anti-American attitudes and sentiments, and an indication of the reorientation and/or expansion of activities which appears advisable in order to increase their effectiveness in reducing such attitudes and sentiments. This latter aspect provides the basis for the strategic concept of the plan. Since Western Europe is an area of conflicting psychological forces, consideration is also given to the aim, scope, form and effectiveness of communist psychological operations as well as possible Soviet reactions to the psychological strategy herein proposed.

2. The General Pattern of Current Psychological Operations

Although there is no psychological strategy plan for Western Europe as a whole, the various overt, non-attributable and private agency programs which are, or should be capable of influencing anti-American attitudes and sentiments in the area, when viewed from the standpoint of U.S. security objectives and the methods in which they are employed to achieve these objectives, reveal the following characteristics:

(a) Objectives

(1) U.S. information programs in Western Europe have concentrated on the creation of European attitudes favorable to the successful implementation of our national objectives, and have sought to communicate and to extend the influence of U.S. policies and programs when favorable and

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to counter and limit their impact when unfavorable. Among their major objectives have been the encouragement of friendship for the United States and the solicitation of support of the governments and the majority of the peoples for basic U.S. foreign policy.

(2) This official propaganda of the United States has also made a major effort to resolve the psychological impact of differences originating and continuing within the free world, and has attempted to counter Soviet-inspired anti-U.S. propaganda.

(3) The United States has also made a major effort to advance defense policies of mutual concern to itself and Western European governments.

(b) Methods

(1) The overt information and education programs have been largely centrally directed, designed and administered, with finished and semi-finished informational materials produced in Washington and New York for official distribution and broadcast abroad; in part organized on a country basis in which individual posts in Western Europe have become increasingly responsible for determining the kind and extent of media services required and in part organized on a regional basis wherein the U.S. Special Representative for Europe has been responsible for developing materials in Europe which deal with European-wide subjects such as European integration, OEEC, Schuman Plan, and information support for NATO and SHAPE.

(2) Necessary psychological pressures in Western Europe have been exerted through diplomatic and indigenous rather than public and overt channels, notably in connection with the Contractual Agreements and the still unratified Treaty establishing the European Defense Community.

(3) In order to eliminate sources of friction between the United States and its Western European allies arising from the presence of

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U.S. troops, certain bi-national information programs have been developed in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Further than this, however, the United States had not developed any aspect of a coalition psychological strategy.

(4) In countering Soviet propaganda in Western Europe, the United States has avoided direct rebuttal and has relied on continuous exposure of the nature of the Soviet regime, and on continuous projection of the constructive character of the policies of the United States.

(5) The U.S. has aimed at convincing the peoples of Western Europe that the U.S.-sponsored media materials are coming from their own fellow citizens, and increasing efforts have been made to enlist the support of indigenous European organizations in acting as sponsors for such materials particularly in support of U.S.-approved defense and economic objectives, and in the case of European integration, politico-economic objectives.

(6) During the late summer and early autumn of 1952, U.S. diplomatic officials in France and Germany mindful of prevalent anti-U.S. sentiments and attitudes in those countries, provided informal advice to the respective governments but did not intervene openly in support of U.S. defense objectives on the assumption that such active intervention would give both nationalists and communists opportunities to further increase anti-American sentiments in the area. In early 1953, key U.S. officials consulted with European leaders on the advancement of defense policies of mutual concern to the United States and the Western European governments.

(7) The United States has enlisted the cooperation of private agencies in providing programs for the support of approved national purposes. [However, the most influential of such agencies, the U.S. press,

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remained largely beyond the realm of government influence, and its actions were not formally coordinated with U.S. Government actions in support of its national defense objectives.]

(8) Heavily-staffed U.S. installations in Europe undertook a wide range of programs and activities directly bearing on the domestic affairs of the various European states.

(9) Certain legislative and other official actions on the U.S. Government in its domestic sphere were not coordinated with the U.S. Government actions in the foreign psychological field.

3. Impact of U.S. Psychological Operations

U.S. psychological operations constitute but one aspect of the total means by which the United States registers an impact on the attitudes, emotions, and sentiments of the peoples of Western Europe. Within the scope of these operations, certain costly instrumentalities, such as radio, have had but a marginal psychological influence on Western European minds. From the standpoint of psychological strategy, therefore, the problem is to provide a basis for determining the relative degree of emphasis which should be placed on various type activities which are subject to the control or influence of the United States in order that anti-Americanism can be reduced and that the United States national purposes with respect to Western Europe's role in the free world coalition can be more readily achieved.

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(a) Impact of Information Programs in Support of the NATO Effort

(1) As indicated in Part I of the Analysis, a major problem for the United States has been the inevitable rise of anti-American attitudes stemming from U.S. leadership in the NATO effort. The achievement of U.S. objectives with respect to the USSR and its satellites within the NATO framework

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depends to a large extent on public opinion and attitudes in Western Europe, particularly France, the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy, and the problem is intensified by the fact that European governments have not generated public support in their own countries for the NATO concept.

(2) In part, reluctance among the European governments to undertake the effective conditioning of their domestic public opinion has stemmed from the fact that Europeans are chiefly interested in NATO as a deterrent to war, rather than as a means of achieving victory if war comes. In Denmark, for example, public opinion polls taken before and after positive information campaigns in support of NATO, made clear that an increased understanding of the NATO obligation resulted in a less enthusiastic popular attitude towards the present policy of firm commitment to the Western alliance. Although this may be considered an isolated example, it nevertheless highlights one of the fundamental choices confronting the psychological strategy planners--whether to develop programs which result in vague, undifferentiated good will on the part of individuals who are not psychologically prepared to cope with the underlying realities of the world power struggle, or whether to develop a lesser but more steadfast group of individuals who are psychologically prepared for relevant political action in support of mutually agreed purposes, including where desirable positive actions for the reduction of anti-American attitudes and sentiments.

(3) It should be noted that aside from an exchange of policy information with the United Kingdom and jointly conducted psychological warfare operations in North Africa, Italy, and Western Europe during World War II, the United States has little or no experience of the successful conduct of a coalition psychological strategy during war or peace.

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(4) While the United States, through NATO, has erected a military framework for the conduct of coalition warfare, it has not seen fit to develop a corresponding psychological instrumentality. The United States position with respect to the development of NATO information programs has been that public information will be promoted and coordinated in furtherance of the objectives of the Treaty with responsibility for the national programs left to each country. While supporting ^{the position} that the North Atlantic Treaty Information Service (NATIS) should supply the impetus, and act as a clearing house for ideas and material, the United States has indicated that NATIS should not itself attempt to replace the information services of the member countries. At the same time, the United States has made it plain that it has not been prepared to consider any mutual financial assistance under NATO auspices for the purposes of stimulating national propaganda efforts.

(5) In its domestic field the United States has undertaken a systematic and detailed public information campaign on NATO problems, through press conferences, press releases, radio programs, and official statements, both to the press, the public at large, and Congress, and has encouraged the development of private groups with particular interests in NATO, such as the Atlantic Citizens Council and the U.S. Interim Committee in Support of NATO. There is little evidence that Western European countries have undertaken any programs of similar scope or scale, and there is good evidence that this gap between government commitment and public support is a contributing factor to the prevalent anti-American attitudes and sentiments. Since the margin of public support for NATO in many European nations has steadily declined to a degree where it now places a political ceiling on the magnitude of future European ^{contributions,} defense/U.S. efforts to secure vitally necessary defense commitments have tended to

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increase anti-American sentiments.

(b) Impact of MSA Programs*

For the purposes of this analysis, it may suffice to point out that certain influential European groups have evidenced an increasing distaste for the form of U.S. financial aid which perpetuates the donor-beneficiary relationship. There is evidence of increasing desire among the Europeans to stand on their own feet, although few are convinced that is possible under present conditions. There is considerable feeling that the present trend in U.S. aid policies may lead to a sort of economic vassalage to the United States for an indefinite period. Since Europeans are less fearful of losing and less concerned about receiving U.S. economic aid for defense, the impact of U.S. economic leverage on European policy has diminished to a point where its employment (as evidenced by the French budget controversy in the Fall of 1952) has contributed to an increase in anti-American sentiments. In addition, European labor has demonstrated a tendency to grow cynical when the benefits of the U.S. system are stressed, while major industrialists have become fearful of programs which to them have the appearance of labor agitation. Despite some willingness on the part of individual producers to learn new methods, the bulk of the industrial owners have shown a preference to remain attached to their own ways of doing business, and attempts to sell U.S. methods by boasting of U.S. superiority have given additional impetus to anti-American attitudes and sentiments.

(c) Impact of Related Defense Activities

(1) The general psychological climate noted above detracts from the psychological effectiveness of such defense programs as military

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end-item assistance, as well as off-shore procurement, while the demands of the infrastructure programs, especially those involving the requisition of large areas of fertile farm lands for air fields and military facilities, have stimulated anti-U.S. attitudes and sentiments. At times public relations problems with respect to such facilities have been acute.

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(2) Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program more than 5,000 foreign nationals, the bulk of whom are from NATO countries, are annually receiving training in the United States. This has provided opportunities to develop relations between the trainees and U.S. personnel, as well as the exchange of ideas between young men of the NATO countries, and has created a reservoir of understanding with respect to U.S. and NATO purposes.

(3) Wherever large contingents of U.S. military personnel have been stationed, Troop Acceptance Activities have been organized in Western Europe. They have been a useful mechanism in reducing anti-U.S. attitudes and sentiments,

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(4) The eavesdropping European audience to Armed Forces Network (AFN) programs has constantly increased. From the standpoint of overall impact, however, a tendency for such listeners to assume that the programs completely represented American life resulted in unfavorable impressions, particularly as respects the influence of crime and other sensational items on such programs.

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(f) The Impact of the "American Presence"

(1) The large number of U.S. officials stationed abroad in connection with its aid programs, expanded diplomatic activity, information operations, etc., have raised a degree of European irritation and annoyance, as well as some astonishment as to why foreign missions should be so concerned with detailed internal problems of European society.

(2) To the extent that U.S. employees monopolize scarce housing and other facilities and live on a scale greater than indigenous employees of equal rank, jealousy and envy have been evidenced. !!

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(3) In the case of information staffs, steadily increasing numbers of personnel and accompanying administrative responsibilities have hampered Public Affairs Officers in the performance of their more useful functions in the sphere of unobtrusive activities.

(4) The presence of large numbers of vacationing Americans is not a particularly new phenomenon to Europeans, and while a certain amount of envy or annoyance has been created, most Europeans have been appreciative of financial benefits which have accrued from tourist expenditures. No attempts have been made, however, to exploit the psychological potentials of this tourist flow in support of U.S. defense objectives.

(g) The Impact of Foreign-Born Americans

Americans born abroad and their children have been a source of considerable influence in Western Europe. They have close personal contacts with millions of European relatives and friends, and have been quick to resent anti-American propaganda in their countries of origin. Through use of natural and spontaneous lines of communication, they exerted a significant impact on European opinion in support of U.S. defense objectives.

4. Basis for Proposed Psychological Strategy

(a) Introduction

The deepest reason why many Europeans believe what they do about the United States is that they want to. Anti-Americanism permits them to feel justified in rejecting or postponing the necessity and obligation to support NATO commitments, and if they can persuade themselves that the United States is as bad as the USSR, they can square neutralism with their consciences. Hence U.S. policies and programs in themselves cannot be held solely responsible for the present degree of anti-American attitudes and sentiments in Western Europe, nor even when these

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operations are raised to maximum effectiveness will they be capable of completely altering the opinion climate. Rather it must be accepted that a degree of anti-Americanism is the inevitable concomitant of U.S. hegemony in Europe. Since no dramatic, overnight, short-term improvement can be anticipated, the problem must be attacked by a coherently organized, long-range strategic operation.

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(b) Essential Factors

(1) As indicated by the foregoing evaluation, the United States has achieved the most significant psychological results in support of its objectives when it has provided constructive leadership and encouragement to European forces working towards European solutions to European problems, and has achieved the least significant results when solutions to such problems carry the "Made in America" label.

(2) In addition, it should be noted that while the United States possesses extensive resources for influencing Western European sentiments, these resources have ^{KNOWLEDGE} (not always) been employed in accordance with basic strategic principles. As a result, operations at times have been over-centralized with respect to detailed control, and diffuse as respects the blanketing of a wide target area with a variety of appeals and stimuli, not all of which have succeeded in generating support for approved U.S. national objectives. With such considerations in view, the following broad strategic guidance for the conduct of U.S. psychological operations in Western Europe is set forth.

(c) Assumption of the Initiative

In the past, U.S. psychological operations have been handicapped by habit of mind which has tended to deal with events as they arise. In a world struggle this often means that they are already out of control. For the United States to be able to get ahead of events, to grasp

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opportunities, to create and not suffer situations, will continue to be the most urgent requirement of psychological operations. In Western Europe, as elsewhere, a principal objective of U.S. policy is to wrest the political initiative from the Soviets. Any diminution in the European sense of urgency creates a favorable climate for Soviet propaganda which depicts the United States as bent on war and scheming to use European divisions to fight "unnecessary" battles. It follows that particularly in the post-Stalin period the United States cannot permit the bonds of the non-communist world, particularly in Western Europe, to be loosened even momentarily at any period in the world struggle. The United States must insure that its actions are mutually understood and entered into by the Western European peoples. [

(d) Information Task of European Governments

Since European electorates do not at present thoroughly see the realities of current international relationships in the same light as the United States, this formidable task of enlightenment cannot be undertaken by U.S.-media alone, but must be accompanied by efforts sponsored by the European governments themselves. It will be a major task of U.S. diplomacy to support European statesmen and governments in undertaking such effective informational campaigns to bring home to peoples of Western Europe the fact that the United States and Western Europe are interdependent and to reduce anti-American attitudes and sentiments. Since it is easy to arouse national feeling against any project that can be specifically attributed to American influence, the United States should as far as possible enlist the general support of the democratic European opposition in addition to the government leadership, so that a broad base of public opinion hitherto lacking is developed by the European governments in support of defense policies. However, Europeans can be persuaded that the interests

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of the free world are really interdependent only if the United States shows by its deeds that its own people are already convinced. European nations will not make the sacrifices which European union entails if the United States is not ready to make at least the token sacrifices which are required for the achievement of real unity in the free world. [Regardless of what we say, our actions will determine the effectiveness of our propaganda.]

(c) Theme of Interdependent Interests

This theme of interdependent interests must be maintained constantly by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, for the United States cannot expect the European governments to undertake anything that we are unwilling to do ourselves. To the extent permitted by national policy, the United States must avoid the appearance of standing on the side lines and telling Europe to unite without making any appropriate or significant commitment of its own. In the event that U.S. policy is restrictive with respect to governmental programs, there will be an over-riding requirement to stimulate unofficial private organizations capable of shaping European expectations towards increased political, economic, and social links with the United States on terms approximating equality.

(f) Reciprocity

Wherever possible, the U.S. diplomatic approaches to Western European governments on questions of developing indigenous information support should develop the possibility of offering reciprocal privileges for Western European governments either in the United States or other areas in the world of interest to them. For example, the French Government might be offered U.S. information support which recognizes French contribution to Indochina to the world struggle and which helps sell France to the U.S. people, perhaps through domestic U.S. facilities available through the information programs of the Department of Defense. Consideration should

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also be given to programs which can stimulate U.S. tourist flow to favored areas.

(g) Role of Benelux and Scandinavian Nations

From the standpoint of effective psychological strategy, the United States should consider the role of Benelux and Scandinavian nations in sympathetically advancing proposals which are in accord with U.S. national security objectives, and which can be used as a bridge between Anglo-Saxon and other European outlooks to overcome European resistance. (For example, the use of pro-U.S. Scandinavian leaders should be considered with respect to influences on German Socialists.)

(h) Role of European Institutions

For reasons similar to those advanced in (g) above, the role of such institutions as the Council of Europe, OEEC, the CSC and emerging European Political Authority, should be constantly assessed for their potential in advancing proposals which are favorable to U.S. national security objectives, and the question of appropriate support for the information programs of such institutions might be considered by qualified individuals specifically assigned to such tasks.

(i) Reduction of the Impression of Massive Intervention

In order to minimize the psychological disadvantages generated by Western European impressions of U.S. hegemony in Western Europe, the United States, wherever possible, should reduce the apparent scale of its intervention. In this respect, continued efforts should be made to carry out information program as subtly and discreetly as possible, and this should be accompanied by efforts to mitigate the impression of the size of the American establishment in Western Europe.

(j) Reduction of Impression of Detailed Involvement in National Problems

The United States must avoid giving an impression of detailed involvement in the minutiae of the political and economic

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affairs of the various European states and must concentrate its resources on matters of European-wide scope. Any tendency to seek final solution for vexing national problems and the pursuit of various short-range approaches should be eliminated. In exercising its influence on regional problems, the United States should continue to rely on diplomatic means rather than overt propaganda pressures. Discreet approaches must be devised to influence individual groups and organizations to genuinely support Europe-wide purposes parallel to U.S. desires.

(k) Overcoming Resistance to Propaganda

It is axiomatic that the more highly developed a free area is, and the greater the degree of its political maturity and general education, the less effective are the official information activities of a foreign government in that area. As regards Western Europe, therefore, observance of this principle will require

- (1) An increased emphasis on personal contact, persuasion and explanation.
- (2) An increased development of the full potentiality of such long-range programs as libraries, book exchanges and publications, and other specialized activities which have in the past proven more effective in creating understanding and support for the United States and its purposes than programs involving mass media.
- (3) A continuation of cooperative efforts with Western Europeans in non-attributable activities, using European programs and ideas to overcome European resistances, together with increased attention to development of organizational resources based on

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dedicated individuals who are motivated by deep-seated concern for their national liberties in the face of the Soviet threat. This is particularly urgent since to date the United States has developed only a few indigenous advocates who are willing and able to defend U.S. policies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, with anywhere near the fervor which the United States is condemned by its enemies.

- (4) Increased emphasis on cultural relations and educational programs, which can reduce unfavorable European impressions of a United States that is distant and remote on the plane of common cultural and spiritual values, while all too present in terms of physical power in Western Europe. Here the key to the problem lies not in a contest of propaganda techniques, but in the genuine interchange of ideas through discussion and education, in which Europeans are encouraged to face up to and act on the realities and responsibilities of the world situation instead of trying to find scapegoats to relieve them of the burden of choice and decision.

5. Aim, Form, Scope, and Effectiveness of Soviet Psychological Objectives in Western Europe

(a) Aim

The primary aim of Soviet psychological operations in Western Europe is to effect a rupture in the NATO Alliance. Short of this objective, which is probably beyond attainment, Soviet psychological operations aim at weakening national governments by every available means.

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(b) Scope

To achieve its aim of disrupting the free world alliance, the Soviets utilize every device which tends to fragment unity, stimulate schisms, and nullify U.S. leadership. In this context, anti-Americanism is a principal psychological weapon of the Soviets. Not only are there crude and open attacks on the U.S. itself but frequently through the device of international conferences, the Soviets purport to champion causes which all decent persons favor--peace, trade, education, health, etc. In the name of such causes, it seeks to enlist significant groups in all countries--businessmen, teachers, physicians, scientists, journalists, women, youth. [In the sense that it is total propaganda, Soviet activity runs the full scale of human activity.] Communist propaganda in each European country aligns itself spontaneously with Soviet policy and systematically promotes Soviet strategic aims. Thus the information services of the USSR have no need to distribute pamphlets, films, or conduct massive psychological campaigns; all this effort is accomplished by local middlemen to whom the question of material aid and support from the Soviets is often a matter of complete indifference. In fact, Soviet policy is based on a denial of aid to such groups on the theory that they will only become strong through struggle for survival.

(c) Form

Soviet propaganda to audiences in Western Europe stressed that the workers of the world will prevent/^{war,} that the colonial peoples are rising against their oppressors, that rearmament is ruining the economy of the Western world, and that the Atlantic coalition is rent with jealousy and resentment of U.S. supremacy. At the same time special campaigns are maintained to whip up resentment against the United States on the grounds of "atomic diplomacy", "bacteriological warfare", and "economic cannibalism".

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The impression given is that the tide of history is running in favor of the Soviet Union, that the United States will stop at nothing to stem it by violence.

(d) Effectiveness

(1) Soviet-stimulated anti-American propaganda which has sought to direct general European fears and insecurities as well as latent resentments into anti-American channels has reaped a considerable harvest in Western Europe, and it is clear that Soviet propaganda has had considerable effectiveness among a substantial segment of the non-communist population, especially when it has emphasized anti-war themes which already have a deep meaning for the average citizens.

(2) Since there exists a certain mistrust a priori against propaganda of communist origin, the Soviets have relied increasingly upon the use of avowed neutralists and nationalists, and have entrusted a number of apparently non-communist independent organizations with the mission of disseminating anti-U.S. propaganda.

6. Estimate of Soviet Reaction to the Proposed U.S. Psychological Strategy

(a) The proposed U.S. psychological strategy for Western Europe envisages

- (1) the avoidance of intensive overt advocacy and appeals;
- (2) emphasis on European leadership in European undertakings;
- (3) the exertion of necessary pressures through diplomatic and indigenous rather than overt and public channels.

(b) To the extent that this is successful, the Soviets may be expected to concentrate their efforts on attacking European groups and leaders friendly to the United States in order to isolate them from their mass support, to increase their efforts to picture the United States as the sole source of world tension, and to obscure the underlying realities of the world struggle.

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(c) In order to reduce Soviet capabilities to benefit from such counter-moves, the United States should continue psychological operations designed to reduce the support accruing to Soviet-sponsored organizations and individuals by isolating such groups and individuals from their mass following, and should seek increased solidarity with its own allies.

7. Summary and Conclusions

In order to reduce anti-U.S. attitudes and achieve support for its approved national purposes in Western Europe, the United States should pursue the following broad lines of psychological strategy:

- (a) maintain the present basic pattern and scale of psychological operations;
- (b) shift priority and emphasis to slow-media, especially books; information centers, libraries, and educational and cultural exchange programs;
- (c) assist European statesmen and governments in the undertaking of effective informational campaigns in support of NATO objectives;
- (d) concentrate on Europe-wide regional problems, and avoid impression of detailed involvement in nation-state affairs.

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NOTE: Agreement by the Psychological Strategy Board to note the contents of this Annex "A" will be understood as giving it the value of authoritative guidance in determining whether or not implementation plans are in conformity with the desired intent.

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